Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

Released on by William H. Sandholm
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  • Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics Book Detail

  • Author : William H. Sandholm
  • Release Date : 2010-12-17
  • Publisher : MIT Press
  • Genre : Business & Economics
  • Pages : 618
  • ISBN 13 : 0262195879
  • File Size : 23,23 MB
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Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics by William H. Sandholm PDF Summary

Book Description: Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where traditional assumptions about the rationality of agents & knowledge may be inapplicable.

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Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics

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Evolutionary game theory studies the behaviour of large populations of strategically interacting agents & is used by economists to predict in settings where tra

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This book offers a compendium of best practices in game dynamics. It covers a wide range of dynamic game elements ranging from player behavior over artificial i

Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Evolutionary Game Dynamics

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This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evoluti

Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of